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THE DELAYED DISCLOSURE OF DR. LORDON'S TESTIMONY WAS 
CAUSED BY THE RESPONDENTS 
A. The Respondents had an Obligation to Discover the DOS 
Agreement During Discovery 
The Respondents assert that the DOS Agreement was produced as soon as it was 
discovered. However, it was the Respondents' own failures to use due diligence to 
search for its existence that delayed its production. Respondent Byrne contends that his 
attorney was under the "misimpression" that the DOS Agreement had been produced at 
Mr. Byrne's May 18, 2006 deposition. A simple review of the deposition testimony 
reveals that Dr. Dille's attorney specifically stated that the DOS Agreement was not in 
effect in 2003 because the Board of Medicine didn't require it. (Supp. R. Vol. V, pg. 
880). A portion of the 2004 DOS Agreement was then handed to counsel for the 
Schmechels. How Mr. Byrne can now aver that his attorney was under the 
"misimpression" that the 2003 DOS Agreement was produced at his deposition, when his 
attorney was present at the deposition and had copies of the deposition transcript is 
questionable at best. 
From the first time that the Schmechels requested production of the 2003 DOS 
Agreement in their First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, on June 29, 
2006, the Respondents were under an obligation to diligently search for that document. 
(Supp. R. Vol. V, pgs. 893, 908). The Respondents didn't begin that search until a week 
before trial, and even at that time it was at the prompting from the Schmechels. Thus, the 
argument that the 2003 DOS Agreement was produced when it was discovered fails to 
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recognize that the Respondents had an obligation to discover the Agreement almost a 
year and a half earlier. 
B. Whether the 2003 and 2004 DOS Agreements are "Nearly" Identical 
is Irrelevant. 
Rosie Schmechel was seen by and passed away under the care and treatment of 
Mr. Byrne, Dr. Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute in 2003. There is no relevant 
event or fact of this case that occurred in 2004. Thus, the futility of relying on any 
portion of the 2004 DOS Agreement between Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne was readily 
apparent from the onset of litigation. 
The 2004 DOS Agreement is irrelevant for three reasons. First, even if the 
Schmechels would have provided their experts, such as Dr. Lordon, the 2004 DOS 
Agreement and had Dr. Lordon relied on the 2004 Agreement to form his opinions, any 
objection to Dr. Lordon's testimony from the Respondents based on irrelevancy of the 
2004 DOS Agreement would have undoubtedly been sustained by Judge Bevan. Second, 
Dr. Lordon would have discounted any weight he placed on the 2004 Agreement because 
it was not in effect at the time of the events in question. Finally, the Schmechels had 
absolutely no way of knowing that the two agreements had any similarities. The 
Respondents address, at length, the similarities of the two documents but ignore the fact 
that the Schmechels were blinded as to those similarities until a week before trial due to 
the Respondents shelving their duty to provide timely discovery responses. 
C. Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne's Testimony that Mr. Byrne's Care and 
Treatment of Rosie was Allowed by the DOS Agreement is Self-
Serving and Not Credible 
The Respondents contend that because both Dr Dille and Mr. Byrne testified that 
Mr. Byrne acted within the bounds of the medical treatment he was authorized to provide 
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by the 2003 DOS Agreement, defining what those parameters are through the 
Schmechels' experts, such as Dr. Lordon, was unnecessary. This argument is analogous 
to stating that because a physician being sued for medical negligence testifies that she 
doesn't believe that she breached the standard of care, the claimants' expert testimony 
that the physician did breach the standard of care isn't relevant and should be excluded. 
The flaw in the Respondents' argument is obvious; it is biased testimony that 
conveniently affords the Respondents a means to assert "no hann done." 
The District Court abused its discretion in not allowing the Jury to consider 
testimony other than the testimony of Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille. Such testimony would 
have reflected that in fact, disregarding the parameters of the DOS Agreement and not 
limiting Mr. Byrne's ability to practice medicine jeopardized patient care. In terms of 
assessing whether there was a fair administration of justice and a fair opportunity for both 
parties to present the theories of their case, it is quite unjust for Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne 
to fail to produce the 2003 DOS Agreement and then offer their own testimony about the 
"dynamic process" of complying with the 2003 DOS Agreement at trial, meanwhile 
precluding Dr. Lordon from testifying as to what the 2003 DOS Agreement actually 
authorized Mr. Byrne to do in terms of patient care. 
As Respondent Byrne points out, Dr. Dille testified that he had "no intent of 
trying to limit Mr. Byrne's ability to practice. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1411-1412). This 
concession by Dr. Dille only emphasizes that Dr. Dille was giving Mr. Byrne a free rein 
on the practice of medicine and not adhering to the fundamental distinctions in the 
practice of medicine between a board-certified physician and a physician assistant. 
Precluding Dr. Lordon from testifying that the DOS Agreement defines that distinction 
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unfairly prevented the Schmechels from establishing their burden of proof. The District 
Court's decision is not in accordance with the applicable law found in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26, and decisions by this Court addressing the prejudice one party suffers at 
the hands of another party's failure to use due diligence. Nonetheless, it would hardly be 
innocuous to permit the Respondents' blatant violations of the discovery rules even 
accepting Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille's censored testimony as true. The District Court did 
not weigh the culpability of the Respondents with their delayed production of the 2003 
DOS Agreement against the resulting prejudice to the Schmechels. Southern Idaho 
Production Credit Association v. Astorquia, I 13 Idaho 526, 532, 746 P.2d 985, 991 
(1987). The Jury's inability to learn of any other opinions regarding the DOS Agreement 
other than Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille's, significantly impaired the Jury's full evaluation of 
the case. Roe v. Doe, ]29 Idaho 663,668,931 P.2d 657,662 (Ct. App. 1996). In limiting 
the testimony to Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille's self-interested statements, the Trial Court 
abused its discretion and impeded the Schmechels' right to a fair trial. 
D. The Schmechels' Experts did not Tes'tify that the Respondents 
Complied with the DOS Agreement 
The Respondents misguidedly argue that the Schmechels' experts testified that the 
Respondents complied with Idaho law in their care and treatment of Rosie. This 
argument is not only inaccurate, but it is fruitless. Dr. Lordon was precluded from 
testifying as to whether Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille complied with Idaho Law because the 
Court did not allow Dr. Lordon to testify as to whether he believed the Respondents 
complied with the 2003 DOS Agreement, which was required by Idaho Law. (Trial Tr. 
Vol. I, pg. 344). Dr. Lordon specifically testified that it was his opinion that Mr. Byrne 
breached the standard of care, and that if Dr. Diile didn't know the dosages prescribed by 
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Mr. Byrne, which Dr. Dille's own testimony confirms he did not, then Dr. Dille also 
breached the standard of care. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pgs 346-347). Dr. Lordon did not testify, 
contrary to what the Respondents suggest, that Mr. Byrne complied with Idaho Law, 
rather, Dr. Lordon testified that he was not critical of the fact that Mr. Byrne treated 
Rosie. The difference is monumental. Dr. Lordon recognized that Idaho Law permits 
physician assistants to evaluate and implement a pain management plan; he did not testify 
that Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille complied with at DOS Agreement, as required by Idaho law 
in the IDAPA regulations. 
Mr. Keller and Dr. Lipman held similar opinions. They were not critical of the 
fact that Mr. Byrne treated Rosie, but they were critical of the treatment provided and the 
lack of supervision and oversight on the part of Dr. Dille. Mr. Keller stated he was 
critical of the communications between Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne and was of the opinion, 
to a reasonable degree of probability, that the standard of care was breached in that 
regard. (Trial Tr. Vol. !, pg. 469). Like Dr. Lordon, Mr. Keller's testimony spoke 
directly to the relevance and the significance of the 2003 DOS Agreement because the 
Agreement specifically defines the nature of the relationship between Mr. Byrne and Dr. 
Dille. 
E. The Late Disclosure ofthe.2003 DOS Agreemeut did Preclude the 
Plaintiffs from Disclosing Expert Opinions 
On October 10, 2007, six days before trial, Mr. Byrne provided the Schmechels 
with the 2003 DOS Agreement between Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille that was in effect at the 
time of Rosie's death. (Supp. R. Vol. V, pg. 954). The Respondents now advance that 
the Schmechels were not precluded from disclosing expert testimony concerning the 
2003 DOS Agreement because the IDAPA regulations were available to them and 
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because the Respondents produced the 2004 DOS Agreement. Again, what this argument 
fails to account for is the utter irrelevancy of the 2004 DOS Agreement. Had the 
Schmechels provided their experts with the 2004 DOS Agreement and elicited testimony 
pertaining to the 2004 DOS Agreement, an objection from the Respondents would meet a 
sustained ruling from the Trial Court. In addition, because counsel for Dr. Dille 
represented to the Schmechels that no DOS Agreement was required by the 2003 IDAP A 
regulations, the Schmechels respected counsel's assertion and litigated the case with the 
faith that counsel would only make such a representation after using due diligence in the 
inquiry. 
Contrary to the Trial Court's ruling that "the nature of the inquiry and the 
circumstances surrounding this testimony were !mown in advance sufficiently to allow 
this disclosure," the nature of the inquiry was for the year 2003 and the circumstances 
surrounding their testimony were for the year 2003. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pg 344). Such as 
with all contracts, if it was not in effect at the time the contract was allegedly broken, 
then the contract is rendered meaningless. The 2004 DOS Agreement was meaningless 
to the Court, to both parties, and even more certainly, to the Schmechels' own experts. 
F. Dr. Lordon's Anticipated Testimony Regarding the 2003 DOS 
Agreement was not Rebuttal Testimony 
As the Respondents indicate, the Trial Court did state that it would consider 
allowing the Schmechels to address issues regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement in 
rebuttal. However, Dr. Lordon's testimony regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement was not 
for the purpose of refuting new matter addressed in the Respondents' defense of the case, 
it was a primary focus in the Schmechels' case in chief. Having believed that no 2003 
DOS Agreement existed, the Schmechels were narve to the fact that the Respondents 
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could have raised it as a defense. It was only upon the Schmechels' renewed prompting, 
just before trial, that the Respondents' even realized that the Agreement existed. 
Essentially, the Trial Court's decision to "revisit" allowing Dr. Lordon to testify on 
rebuttal regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement rewarded the Respondents by allowing them 
to present a defense to the Agreement in their case in chief and sanctioned the 
Schmechels by not allowing them to present the primary theories of their case. This 
decision prejudiced the Schmechels and unjustly blessed the Respondents even though it 
was the Respondents' tack of diligence in the discovery process that created the issue. 
Even in light of the Trial Court's suggestion to "revisit" Dr. Lordon's testimony 
on rebuttal, it was not an appropriate remedy to overcome the prejudice suffered by the 
Schmechels from the late disclosure. The Schmechels were unfairly surprised as they 
were essentially marooned by learning of the Agreement's mere existence days before 
trial. The Trial Court abused its discretion in not remedying the late production and 
allowing Dr. Lordon to express his opinions regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement. 
II. DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY WAS PREJUDICIAL AND HARMFUL 
TO THE SCHMECHELS' CASE 
Respondent Byrne asserts that "defendants informed plaintiffs from the outset of 
expert discovery that Dr. Smith would offer opinions regarding causation ... " To the 
contrary, the Respondents did not disclose that Dr. Smith had an opinion as to Rosie's 
cause of death, on a more probable than not basis, until the eve of trial. This is not the 
type of "seasonal" supplementation contemplated by Rule 26(e). McKim v. Horner, !43 
Idaho 568, 571 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006). 
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A. Ten Days Before Trial is not a Seasonable Disclosure 
The Respondents breached their obligation to supplement their disclosures 
regarding Dr. Smith's expert opinions and as a result, the Schmechels were not prepared, 
through no fault of their own, with a rebuttal witness to effectively challenge Dr. Smith's 
new theory that Rosie died of cardiac complications. The Respondents breached their 
duties under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) in no uncertain terms, and this failure to 
comply with the rules should have warranted the "typical" result of the proffered 
evidence being excluded. Radmer v. Ford lvfotor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d 897, 
900 {1991). 
FU1iherrnore, this Court has recognized the additional prejudice that arises from a 
late disclosure when the testimony is from an expert witness. City of lvfcCall v, Seubert, 
142 Idaho 580, 586, 130 P.3d 1118, l 124 (2006), citing, Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal 
Co,, 136 Idaho 648, 652, 39 P,3d 588, 592 (2001). The Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules which arrived at the draft of Rule 26 articulated: 
"In cases of this character (involving expert testimony), a prohibition 
against discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in 
acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent. 
Effeetive cross examination of an expert witness requires advance 
preparation ... Similarly eftective rebuttal advances knowledge of the line 
of testimony of the other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against 
discovery, the narrowing of the issues and elimination of surprise which 
discovery normally produces are frustrated," 
Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 26, Federal Rules Civ. Proe., 28 U.S.C.A. This Court 
should follow the guidance of the Advisory Committee and remain consistent with the 
holding of McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 571 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006) and find that 
l O days before trial is not a seasonable supplementation of an expert witness disc!osure, 
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Notably, the Trial Court erroneously concluded that Dr. Smith's new opinion was 
"an extension of the nature of his opinion disclosed on June Jg'h_,, (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pg. 
1579). Dr. Smith's disclosure on June 18th was that the cause of Rosie's death was 
"uncertain." Dr. Smith's new opinion, disclosed 10 days before trial, was that Rosie died 
on a more likely than not basis, due to a cardiac event. To effectively counter this 
testimony, the Schmechels would have had to consult, qualify, seek evaluation from and 
secure trial testimony of a cardiac physician within 10 days. This impossible feat is 
precisely the unjustness that Rule 26 is in place to prevent. 
B. Plaintiffs Elected not to Depose Dr. Smith Because Dr. Smith did not 
Hold an Opinion as to Rosie's Cause of Death on a More Likely than 
not Basis 
The Respondents argue that the Schmechels are somehow responsible for being 
surprised by Dr. Smith's opinion at trial because the Schmechels elected not to depose 
Dr. Smith. The logic in this argument is dubious. The decision not to depose Dr. Smith 
was premised upon Dr. Smith's opinion disclosure that he did not have an opinion as to 
what the cause of Rosie's death was on a more likely than not basis. In fact, Dr. Smith's 
initial disclosure stated that Dr. Smith's opinion was "that the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's 
death is uncertain." (Supp. R, Vol. I, pg. 173). Thus, the Schmechels rationally 
determined that deposing him would be a futile endeavor. 
Moreover, the Respondents' suggestion that the coroner's and pathologist's 
depositions were necessary for Dr. Smith to form his new and different opinion regarding 
Rosie's cause of death is also amiss. The coroner, Ms. Anton, and the pathologist, Dr. 
Groben, produced reports regarding their findings from their respective investigation and 
autopsy at the time of Rosie's death. The Respondents possessed the totality of the 
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information they claim Dr. Smith needed to make the determination regarding his cause 
of death opinions at least as early as February 24, 2006. This is the date when the 
Schmechels served their responses to Respondent Byrne's First Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production. (See, Register of Actions, R. Vol. I, pg. 12). The responses 
contained Ms. Anton's report. (Defendants Ex. 207, pg. 13). Dr. Smith did not rely on 
any information contained in Ms. Anton's deposition that wasn't already contained in her 
initial report from the time of her death, almost four years before Ms. Anton's deposition 
was taken. Ms. Anton's report indicated that the television was on, there was a lit 
cigarette that had fallen to the floor between Rosie's legs, was fully dressed and she was 
seated in the middle of the couch and partially slumped over. (Def Ex. 207, pg. 13; Trial 
Tr. Vol. I, pgs. 750-751 ). Dr. Smith stated that he relied on this information, which 
indicated that Rosie was awake when she died, to arrive at has new opinion. Thus, 
Respondent Byrne's contention that Dr. Smith relied on Ms. Anton's deposition to form 
his late opinion that Rosie's death was cardiac in nature is unsound. 
Notably, the Respondents do not explain how Dr. Groben's deposition testimony 
was necessary for Dr. Smith to form his cause of death opinions. Again, all of the 
information that is revealed in Dr. Groben's deposition was already previously contained 
in his autopsy report. Dr. Smith could have just as easily relied on Dr. Groben's report as 
his deposition testimony to form his unseasonable opinions. The Respondents' argument 
regarding the Schmechels' election not to depose Dr. Smith is particularly unsound in 
light of the fact that the discovery rules were promulgated to avoid the expense of 
depositions where disclosures are intended to adequately set forth the conclusions of 
expert witnesses. 
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C. Whether the Jury Reached the Issue of Causation is not Significant 
The Respondents claim that even if Dr. Smith's testimony was improperly 
allowed by the Trial Court, the Trial Court's decision does not warrant reversal because it 
was a harmless error based upon the Jury's finding of no negligence. This argument 
treats the finding of negligence as mutually exclusive from Dr. Smith's testimony 
regarding the cause of Rosie's death. However, the two elements can not be logically 
separated when considering the effect that Dr. Smith's testimony had on the Schmechels' 
theory of negligence. The Schmechels' theory was that Rosie died because of Methadone 
poisoning, negligently and/or recklessly prescribed by Mr. Byrne. Unbeknownst to the 
Schmechels, Dr. Smith had an entirely new and different opinion on Rosie's cause of 
death that was completely unrelated to Methadone poisoning. Thus, it is not improbable 
that the Jury determined that Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille did not breach the standard of care 
because their negligence was not what caused Rosie's death. If the Jury believed Dr. 
Smith's testimony that Rosie died from a cardiac related event, then they had to have 
naturally and logically determined that Mr. Byrne's unauthorized prescription regimen of 
Methadone was not the cause, and thus, he was not negligent. 
In this era of modern litigation, parties have a right to expect not only that they 
will be afforded the protection of the rules of discovery, but that the rules will be applied 
equally to one party as to the other. The wrench that Dr. Smith's tardily disclosed 
opinions threw into the Schmechels' case significantly inhibited any chance they had at a 
fair trial. Accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion in not excluding Dr. Smith's 
testimony. 
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III. THE IDAP A REGULATIONS ARE THE LAW IN IDAHO AND 
THE JURY SHOULD HA VE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW 
A. The Standard of Care in the IDAP A Regulations is Unambiguous 
The Respondents rely heavily on Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 P.3d 1076 
(2001) to support their assertion that the IDAPA regulations do not clearly define the 
standard of care for physicians assistants in Idaho. The Court in Ahles determined that the 
statute in question, LC. § 49-60 l, was not clear because it required consideration of 
problematic definitions of terms used in the statute. 136 Idaho at 396, 34 P.3d at l 079. 
Interpretation of the statute was significantly muddled by the fact that there were 
conflicting definitions of the term "highway" and "roadway." As an example, Justice 
Walters noted that although the statute does not define the term "shoulder," the statute 
describes a shoulder as part of a highway but excludes shoulder as part of a roadway. Id. 
In the instant case, there is no such conflict in the interpretation of the statute. Rather, 
IDAPA § 22.0l.03.030.03 (2003) straightforwardly states, "(a) physician assistant shall 
not write prescriptions ... diagnose and manage major illnesses or conditions or manage 
the health care of unstable or acutely ill or injured patients unless those conditions are 
minor." Unlike the situation in Ahles, the IDAPA regulations governing physician 
assistants do not create ambiguity or confusion. 
Furthermore, the IDAPA regulations set forth a very clear directive for physicians 
assistants regarding chronically ill patients: a physician assistant may "manage(s) the 
health care of the stable chronically ill patient in accordance with the medical regimen 
initiated by the supervising physician." IDAPA § 22.01.03.030.04 (2003). Mr. Byrne 
admitted that Dr. Dille did not confirm Mr. Byrne's treatment plan and prescription 
regimen for Rosie and that Rosie died without Dr. Dille ever knowing the prescribed 
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dosages of Methadone and Hydrocodone were. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pg. 792). The 
regulations could not be clearer that the regimen is to be initiated by the supervising 
physician, not by the physician assistant. The regulations speak directly to Dr. Dille and 
Mr. Byrne, so as to prevent exactly what transpired in this case. 
More notably, what the Respondents no doubt purposely fail to underscore is the 
second factor in the Sanchez v. Galey analysis, that "the statute or regulation was 
intended to prevent the harm caused by the defendant's act or omission." 112 Idaho 609, 
617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242. (1986) (emphasis added). IDAPA regulation§ 22.01.03.028 
specifically limits the scope of practice for physician assistants so that they do not engage 
in the unauthorized practice of medicine and negotiate a lesser standard of patient care. It 
is difficult to imagine a more telling set of facts than the present case in which the 
IDAPA regulations would speak to. Mr. Byrne exceeded the restrictions placed on him 
by the plain language of the IDAP A regulations. In so doing compromised the care of his 
patient, Rosie Schmechel. 
The Respondents' contentions that Dr. Vorse testified that Rosie was a "complex 
patient," and that such testimony supports their argument that the IDAP A regulations are 
ambiguous, is misguided. Based on Dr. Vorse's previous treatment of Rosie, Dr. Vorse 
believed she was a complex patient, rather than a patient with a "minor" illness as Mr. 
Byrne testified. This dispute was the crux of the Schmechels' argument: Rosie was not a 
patient with a "minor" illness and a physician assistant shouldn't have assumed the entire 
responsibility of her care. This debate over whether Rosie had a "minor" illness or was a 
complex patient was for the Jury to decide. What the Respondents fail to recognize is 
that the words "minor" and "manage" are not medical terms of art or obscure terms. In 
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fact, the Board of Medicine, in promulgating the IDAP A regulations likely contemplated 
that the terms "minor" and "manage" could be easily understood and interpreted. 
The argument is similar to negligence per se allegations in motor vehicle 
collisions. If a plaintiff asserts that the defendant was negligent per se because the 
Defendant was driving "too fast for conditions" and there is conflicting testimony on 
what the conditions were, then it becomes a question of fact for the Jury to decide. 
Precisely the same situation presented itself in this case between Dr. Vorse and Mr. 
Byrne's testimony. There was conflicting testimony on whether Rosie was a "complex 
patient" or had a "minor" illness. Accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
not allowing the Jury to decide whether Rosie suffered from a "minor illness" or was a 
"complex patient." 
The Respondents argue that the "Plaintiffs cannot show that a violation of the 
IDAPA regulations proximately caused Mrs. Schmechel's death." This argument 
overlooks the basic theory of the Schmechels' case: Mr. Byrne was acting outside the 
scope of what he was authorized to do under Idaho law, and in so doing, negligently 
prescribed lethal doses of pain medication to Rosie. In other words, it was Mr. Byrne 
and Dr. Dille' s violations of the regulations that caused Rosie to pass. Again, the 
Respondents cite to Dr. Dille's testimony that he wouldn't have done anything different 
than Mr. Byrne did in his care and treatment of Rosie. These self-serving statements do 
nothing to bolster the argument that the IDAPA regulation violations did not proximately 
cause Rosie's death as they are not a basis for the Court to rely on in finding that the 
Respondents' negligence did or did not cause Rosie's death. 
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B. Negligence Per Se Instructions are uot Improper in Medical 
Malpractice Cases 
The Respondents argue that negligence per se instructions are not appropriate in 
medical malpractice c_ascs. However, the Respondents cite to no Idaho precedent to 
support their argument. In fact, recent precedent from this Court suggests that as long as 
(1) the statute or regulation clearly defines the required standard of conduct; (2) the 
statute or regulation is intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act or 
omission caused; (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute or 
regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the violation is the proximate cause of the 
injury, then a negligence per se instruction is appropriate. Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray 
Co. Inc., 145 Idal10 892, 899, 188 P.3d 834, 841 (2008) (citing, O'Guin v . Bingham 
County, 142 Idaho 49, 52 122 P.3d 308, 31 I (2005). 
The Respondents further contend that the Schmechels tried to "circumvent" their 
burden of proof by asserting that the IDAP A regulations establish the standard of care. 
However, the Schmechels presented expert testimony at trial that precisely addressed 
why the Respondents breached the standard of care. The Schmechels certainly were not 
relying on the IDAP A regulations to prove that the standard of care was breached. 
Similar to the situation in Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., the Schmechels 
presented expert witness testimony to meet their burden of proof. However, unlike the 
instant case, the trial court in Obendorf allowed the respondents' experts to testify that it 
was important to comply with the pesticide regulations and then allowed the jury to apply 
the regulations to the facts of the case. 145 Idaho 892, 900 188 P .3d 834, 842 (2008). 
Because the information regarding the pesticide labeling was presented to the jury in 
Obendorf, the trial court gave a negligence per se instruction based on the requirements 
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of the regulations. Id. Similar to the case at hand, there was no attempt in Obendorfto 
"circumvent" the plaintiffs' burden of proof. 
LC: § 6-1012 establishes the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases, and the trial court's instructions apprise juries that the defendant-treatment 
providers must meet that standard. Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho 628, 633, 760 P.2d 
505, 5 l O (1989). The Schmechels do not contend that expert testimony should not be 
required in medical malpractice cases. To the contrary, expert testimony is necessary to 
establish that the standard of care has been breached. However, when there are specific 
laws and regulations that speak directly to the issue of the standard of care, then the Jury 
ought to be instructed on what the law is. The IDAP A regulations are designed to 
"govern the activities of persons employed as physician assistants by persons licensed to 
practice medicine ... " IDAPA 22.01.03.000 (2003). They are the law in Idaho and the 
Trial Court had an obligation to instruct the Jury on the law. Newberry v. Martens, 142 
Idaho 284,289, 127 P.3d 187, 192 (2005). 
Furthermore, the Trial Court had a duty to instruct the Jury on the Schmechels' 
theories which were supported by the evidence, and the facts must be construed most 
favorably to the party requesting the instruction. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 769, 
890 P.2d 714, 720 (1995) (citing, Rosenberg v. Toetly, 94 Idaho 413,420,489 P.2d 446, 
453 (1971)). The Schmechels offered a proposed jury instruction outlining the standard 
of care set forth in the IDAPA regulations which reflected the Schmechels' theories of 
their case and was supported by the evidence. (R. Vol. II, pg. 338). 
20 
C. "Judicial Notice" does not Instruct the Jury on the Law 
The Trial Court's reliance on Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 
134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000) and State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209, 832 P.2d 1144 
(Ct. App. 1992), in taking "judicial notice" of the IDAPA regulations within the jury 
instructions was in error and contrary to what the Respondents argue, did effect the 
Schmechels' substantial rights and did prejudice their case. By simply taking judicial 
notice that the IDAPA regulations existed, Jury Instruction No. 28 misled the Jmy into 
believing that Judge Bevan was ensuring that the IDAPA regulations were accounted for. 
(R. Vol. II, pg. 426). Even though the Schmechels were permitted to discuss the IDAPA 
regulations through testimony and mention them in closing arguments, the Jury was still 
not given the opportunity to apply the regulations, the law, to the facts of the case. The 
Jury patiently listened to all of the discussions regarding the IDAPA regulations, but 
when the time came to apply the meaning of the regulations to the case, the Trial Court 
prohibited them from doing so. 
IV. A "RECKLESS" INSTRUCTION WAS NECESSARY TO ADEQUATELY 
PRESENT THE ISSUES AND ST A TE THE APPLICABLE LAW 
A. Bifurcating "Recklessness" was not Harmless Error 
The issue of whether the Respondents' conduct was reckless, despite what the 
Respondents assert, is relevant to the case independently from the issue of negligence. 
As the Respondents recognize, there is a distinction between recklessness and negligence, 
in that recklessness is a higher degree of culpable conduct than negligence. The 
Schrnechels presented testimony at trial through Dr. Lipman that the Respondents were at 
the very least negligent, but that they were also reckless. Yet, the Jury never was entitled 
to learn what the legal difference between the two was and apply it to the facts as they 
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heard them. This Court has held that the instructions must fairly and adequately present 
the issues and state the applicable law. Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462 
886 P.2d 330, 338 (1994). Here, by taking away the issue of recklessness altogether, the 
Trial Court prevented the Jury from applying the law to the facts that they heard. 
Importantly, this Court has also held that failure to submit a party's defenses and 
theories to the jury is reversible error. Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 
112 Idaho 722,731,735 P.2d 1033, 1042 (1987). Again, the Schmechels presented the 
theory through expert testimony that the Respondents' conduct was reckless. Curiously, 
the Trial Comt recognized in its ruling on the issue that "in a typical case ... recklessness 
is something that is put on the verdict form initially ... " (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 1883-
1884). Yet the Court still elected to bifurcate the issue. The decision unduly emphasized 
the Respondents' view of the evidence that they were not reckless and amounted to the 
Court making a determination that should have been up to the Jury to decide. 
Regardless of whether "recklessness" constitutes a higher standard of culpable 
behavior than "negligence" or not, it is imperative to recognize that the Jury cannot know 
the difference if it is not so instructed. The Trial Court stated that it reviewed the 
testimony of Dr. Lipman and concluded that the issue of recklessness should be 
addressed only if the Jury found negligence and awarded an amount exceeding the 
statutory cap. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 1883-1884). However, the Jury was specifically 
informed by Dr. Lipman that Respondent Byrne "knew or should have known" that his 
care and treatment of Rosie created an unreasonable risk of harm to her. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 
pgs. 665-669). Reversible error occurred here because the Trial Court's decision to 
bifurcate recklessness out of the instructions misled the jury into believing that it wasn't 
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an issue and it also significantly prejudiced the Schmechels by severing an important 
theory to their case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Schmechels respectfully request this Court to reverse the District Court's 
aforementioned evidentiary rulings and errors in instructing the Jury. Specifically, the 
Schmechels request that this Honorable Court reverse the Trial Court's denial of the 
Schmechels' Motion for a New Trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, This 23 rd day of January, 2009. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
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